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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents D.

Scott McGregor and Eldon L.

Rich-

ardson, II, brought the instant action seeking a declaratory
judgment

that

a

certain "Compensation Agreement•

dated

December 3, 1981, was null and void and of no force and
ef feet

against

the

respondents.

Respondents

also

sought

damages based on certain alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of the appellants and for breach by defendant-appellant Benz of his fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the
respondents.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 12, 1983, appellants Peter A. Benz and
David Cowan filed a certain Motion for Leave to File an
Amended

Answer and

Parties.

Counterclaim and

to Join Additional

On March 7, 1983, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,

District Judge, issued an Order Denying Motion of Defendants
Peter A.

Benz and David Cowan for Leave to File Amended

Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties and a
certain

Memorandum Decision setting

the Order.

forth

his reasons

for

Respondents and appellants subsequently stipu-

lated to the entry of

judgment

in favor of respondents on

one of respondents' claims and the dismissal of respondents'

-

1 -

remaining

claims.

Appellants

have

appealed

from Junge

Hanson's Order and Memorandum Decision.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmance by the Utah Supreme
Court

of

the

Order and

Honorable Timothy R.
Court of

Salt

Memorandum Decision

by the

Hanson of the Third Judicial District

Lake County,

dants' -appellants'

issued

Motion

State of
for

Utah,

denying

defen-

Leave to File an Amended

Answer and Counterclaim and to Join Additional Parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents generally agree with the Statement of
Facts set forth
However,

in Appellants' Brief at pages 2 through 4.

in order to fully understand Judge Hanson's Order

and Memorandum Decision of March

7,

1983, a review of the

history of this action up to and including March 7, 1983, is
necessary.
l.

McGregor

and

The following
On

January

Eldon

L.

is a history of this action:

28,

1982,

Richardson,

respondents
II,

filed

D.
a

Scott

certain

Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

Respondents'

Complaint sought a

Declaratory Judgment that a certain "Compensation Agreement"

- 2 -

was void and unenforceable as against McGregor and Richardson.

(Transcript, pp. 2-11).
2.

Apellant David Cowan is a citizen and resident

of the State of Utah.

Apellant Peter A. Benz is a resident,

citizen and a member of the Bar of the State of New Jersey.
Jurisdiction over the person of appellant Benz was asserted
pursuant

to

the

Utah Code Ann.
3.

provisions of

the Utah

SS 78-27-24(1) and
On

March

3,

(3)

1982,

(Repl. Vol. 9A 1977).

appellant

certain Motion to Quash Service or,
Motion to Dismiss.
4.

Long Arm Statute,

Benz

filed

a

in the Alternative,

(Transcript, pp. 29-30).

The Motion of Defendant Peter A. Benz to Quash

Service or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss, was heard before
the Law and Motion Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
David B.

Dee presiding, on March 11,

1982, at the hour of

2:00 p.m.

s.
the

Based

upon

the

affidavits of Peter A.

McGregor and Eldon L.
arguments of

pleadings
Benz,

Richardson,

counsel .and being

ises,

on March

trict

Judge,

19,

1982,

entered

on

file,

David Cowan,
II,

D.

Scott

and having heard the

fully advised

in the prem-

the Honorable David B.

certain

including

Dee,

Dis-

Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law and issued an Order Denying Motion of Defendant

-

3 -

Peter A.

Benz to Quash Service or,

Dismiss.

(Transcript, pp. 94-96).

Benz was granted
file

ten

(10)

days,

to

Pursuant to that Order,
until

an Answer to the Complaint.
6.

in the Alternative,

March

29,

(Transcript,

1982,
p.

to

95).

On March 18, 1982, respondents gave notice of

the taking of the deposition of Peter A. Benz on Tuesday,
April

20,

1982.

(Transcript, pg.

75).

Also on March 18,

1982, respondents served notice of the taking of the deposition of David Cowan on Wednesday, April 21, 1982.

(Trans-

cript, p. 7 3) •
7.

On March 18, 1982, respondents served upon

counsel for Benz Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of
Documents Directed to Defendant Peter A. Benz.
pp.

81-84).

9:00 a.m.

(Transcript,

Said documents were to be produced by Benz at
on Monday, April 19, 1982.

(Transcript, pp.

77-84).
8.
his

Answer

asserted

On March 29, 1982, appellant David Cowan filed
to

respondents'

none of

Complaint.

Cowan' s

Answer

the counterclaims which he and appellant

Peter A. Benz now contend are compulsory counterclaims.
(Transcript, pp. 95-100).
9.

Also on March 29,

1982, appellant Peter A.

Benz, rather than filing an Answer to respondents' Complaint
as ordered by the Third Judicial District Court on March 19,

- 4 -

1982,

filed

a

Petition

Court

contesting

for

Judge

Intermediate

David

B.

Dee's

Appeal

with

this

Order of March

19,

1982, on the ground that the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, could not assert in

personam jurisdiction over him.
10.

On

April

14,

1982,

this

Court

denied

the

Petition for Intermediate Appeal filed by appellant Peter A.
Benz.
11.

On April

15,

1982,

seventeen

(17)

days after

he was required to file an Answer to respondents' Complaint,
four

( 4)

days

prior to the date that documents were to be

produced pursuant

to Plaintiffs'

First Request for Produc-

tion of Documents and six (6) days prior to the date set for
the taking of his deposition, appellant Benz filed a certain
Motion

for

Pleading,

Extension

Time

in Which

to

File

Responsive

in Which to Respond to Discovery Request, and for

Protective Order.
1982,

of

Benz'

(Transcript, pp. 105-108).

Motion

was heard

On April 19,

before the Third Judicial

District Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.
the

con cl us ion
(a)
t ion al

ten

of

the
That

Hearing,
Peter

A.

Judge
Benz

be

Rigtrup
granted

At

ordered:
an

add i-

( 10) days to file an Answer to plaintiffs'

Complaint;

- 5 -

(b)
tional

ten

That
( 10)

Peter A.

days

Benz

to respond

be granted

an

addi-

to Plaintiffs'

First

Request for Production of Documents;
(c)

That

within twenty
(d)

the deposition

( 20)

That

of

Benz

be

taken

days of the Court's Order;
plaintiffs

advance

the

air

and
fare

necessary to enable Benz to travel to Salt Lake City
for the taking of his deposition and, if necessary, the
cost of one night's hotel accommodations.
(Transcript, pg. 116-117).
12.

On April 19, 1982, counsel for respondents was

contacted by counsel for appellant Cowan and informed that
the

documents

Request

for

requested

pursuant

to

Plaintiffs'

Production of Documents Directed

First

to Defendant

David Cowan would not be produced on April 19, 1982, as
required therein.
plaintiffs'

counsel

necessitating Mr.
Counsel

In addition,
that

Cowan' s

a

counsel for Cowan informed

family emergency had arisen

absence

for Cowan requested

from the State of Utah.

that Cowan's deposition be

continued until Mr. Cowan could return to the State of Utah.
Accordingly, it was agreed that Mr. Cowan's deposition would
be continued until
(Transcript, pp.
documents

10:00 a.m.
110-111).

requested

pursuant

on Tuesday,

April

27,

1982.

It was also agreed that the
to

Plaintiffs'

First

Request

for Production of Documents would be produced no later than
- 6 -

Friday,

April

firming

the

23,

1982.

On April 20, 1982, a letter con-

telephone conference of April 19,

hand-delivered to counsel for David Cowan.
dated

April

20,

13.

1982,

1982 was

(See letter

attached hereto as Exhibit "A").

On April 23, 1982, counsel for respondents

met with counsel for appellant Cowan for the purpose of
procuring
First

the

documents

Request

for

Production

Defendant David Cowan.
received

some of

requested

pursuant

to

of Documents

Plaintiffs'
Directed

At that time, respondents'

the requested documents but was

to

counsel
informed

that Mr. Cowan had been unable to find all of the documents
requested.

The

Plaintiffs'

remaining documents

First Request

not produced

by Cowan

requested pursuant to

for Production of Documents were
until

Friday,

April

30,

1982.

In addition, counsel for Cowan indicated that Mr. Cowan had
important business matters in Idaho during the week of April
26, 1982, and requested that the deposition of Mr. Cowan be
continued

to

the

following

week.

As an accommodation to

counsel, respondents' counsel agreed to such an extension of
time.

Accordingly, the deposition of David Cowan was again

continued,

this

time

until

10:00 a.m.

on Tuesday,

May 4,

1982. (Transcript, pp. 114-115).
14.
1982,

During a telephone conference on April 26,

between

counsel

for

respondents

- 7 -

and

counsel

for

appellant Benz,

it was agreed that the deposition of Peter

Benz would be taken on May 13,
a.m.

1982, at the hour of 10:00

Accordingly, a Notice of Deposition for the taking of

the Benz deposition was hand-delivered to counsel for Benz
on April 27, 1982.
15.

(Transcript, pp. 112-113).

On April 27,

1982, counsel for respondents

received a certain Notice of Deposition,
depositions

of

respondents

D.

scheduling the

Scott McGregor and

Eldon L.

Richardson, II, for the afternoon of May 13, 1982.

(Trans-

cript, pg. 118).
16.

On April 28,

1982, counsel for respondents

received a Motion of Defendant Peter A. Benz for Protective
Order and Order Compelling Discovery.

Said Motion request-

ed:
(a)

That the deposition of Cowan be continued

to May 13, 1982, or at such time as was convenient to
all parties;
(b)
at

That the respondents be ordered to appear

their depositions
(c)

scheduled

Alternatively,

for May 13,

1982;

and

should respondents not be

available for their depositions on. May 13,

1982,

they pay the

to come to

costs

Salt Lake City,

and

Utah,

expenses

for

Benz

that

for the taking of their deposi-

tions.
(Transcript, pp. 119-120).
- 8 -

17.

Protective

Order

dnd Order Compelling Discovery was argued on May 3,

1982,

be fore

After

the

Defendant

Benz'

Motion

Honorable Dav id B.

Dee,

for

District Judge.

having considered the pleadings on file,

the arguments and

representations of counsel, and being fully advised in the
premises, Judge Dee denied Benz' Motion and ordered that all
prior Orders of the Court be complied with by appellants.
(Transcript, pp. 155-156).
18.
neither
produced
First

As

filed
the

Request

of
an

April
Answer

documents
for

29,
to

1982,

respondents'

requested

Production

appellant

of

Benz

had

Complaint

nor

pursuant

to

Documents

as

Plaintiffs'
required

by

Judge Rigtrup's Order of April 19, 1982.
19.

On May 3, 1982, Peter A. Benz filed his Answer

to respondents' Complaint.

(Transcript, pp. 152-154).

Benz

did not file the counterclaims which both he and David Cowan
now contend are compulsory.
filed

more

Complaint

than

three

( 3)

The Answer of Peter A. Benz was
months

after the

filing of the

and

after two orders of the Third Judicial Dis-

trict Court,

neither of which were complied with by ap-

pellant Benz.
20.
Benz

and

Also

David

on

May

3,

Cowan filed

1982,

appellants

Peter

A.

a certain Complaint against

respondents and others in the Superior Court of New Jersey,

- 9 -

Chancery Division:

Morris County Docket No. c 3221 81.

(Attached hereto as Exhibit "B").
21.

On or about May 4,

1982, counsel for respon-

dents received a certain Notice of Continuance of Taking of
Depositions

from counsel

for

Benz,

continuing

the deposi-

tions of D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, from
May 13, 1982,

to May 17,

1982.

(Transcript, pg.

159).

These were the very depositions for which Benz had sought an
Order of the Third Judicial District Court on May 3, 1982,
compelling

the

22.

attendance

of

McGregor

and

Richardson.

The deposition of Peter A. Benz was taken on

May 17, 1982.

At the conclusion of the deposition, Benz and

his counsel of record advised that they were continuing
without date the depositions of respondents on the specific
representation that an offer of settlement would be made by
Benz "within a reasonable time."
Axland,

Transcript,

pg.

(See Affidavit of LeRoy S.
No offer of settlement was

182).

subsequently received by respondents' counsel from either of
the appellants.
23.

On or about Monday, June 21, 1982, counsel for

respondents contacted,
Peter A.

Benz.

respondents'

by telephone,

At that time,

counsel

that

counsel in this proceeding.

counsel

counsel

Benz

was

for

appellant

for Benz advised

seeking

to

change

(See Affidavit of LeRoy S.

Axland, Transcript, p. 183).
- 10 -

24.

On June 21,

1982, respondents filed a Motion

tor Expedited Trial Setting.

set

forth

therein,

(Transcript, pp. 163-165). As

the Motion for Expedited Trial Setting

was made on the following grounds and for the following
reasons:
(a)

The appellants had sought to hinder and

delay respondents' discovery;
( b)
an

attempt

The filing of the New Jersey action was
by appellants

dents and to obtain a

to harass and annoy respon-

favorable ruling in a forum in

which one of the appellants, Peter A. Benz, is a member
of the Bar;
(c)

That appellant Benz had made no offer of

settlement as he had represented would be done during
the

taking of his deposition on May 17,
(d)

1982; and

The substitution of counsel by appellant

Benz was an attempt to further delay the adjudication
of respondents' claims.
25.

On or about June 23, 1982, counsel for respon-

dents received formal notice from the firm of McKay, Burton,
Thurman & Condie of their withdrawal as counsel for Peter A.
Benz.

(Transcript, pg. 160).
26.

On or about July 1, 1982, counsel for respon-

dents received a Notice of Entry of Appearance filed by
Merlin o.

Baker,

Esq.,

giving notice of the appearance of
- 11 -

the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker as attorneys for
appellant Peter A. Benz.
27.

On

July

(Transcript, p. 180).
7,

1982,

respondents'

Motion

for

Expedited Trial

Setting came on for hearing before the

Honorable

H.

Bryant

Croft

of

the

Third

Judicial

Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

District

After having

reviewed the pleadings on file and having heard the representations and arguments of counsel, respondents' Motion was
denied.

However, Judge Croft set this matter for trial, on

a firm first place setting, in April of 1983.

(Transcript,

p. 187).

28.

Subsequent to July 7, 1982, the appellants

engaged in the following discovery:
(a)
respondents

On or about August 18, 1982, counsel for
received

Defendant

Peter

A.

Benz'

First

Request for Production of Documents Directed to Plaintiffs.

(Transcript,

Defendant Peter A.
of

Documents

September

23,
(b)

pp.

Benz'

Directed
1982.

189-191).

The

Response

to

First Request for Production
to

Plaintiffs

(Transcript,

On January 4,

pp.

was

filed

192-197);

1983, counsel

on
and

for respon-

dents received a certain Notice of Taking Depositions
scheduling the depositions of respodents for January 18
and 19 , 19 8 3 .

(Transcript, pp. 198-199).

- 12 -

29.

On November 4, 1982, Judge Arnold M. Stein of

tlie Superior Court of New Jersey entered a certain norder
Staying Action on Conditionn in the action filed by Benz and
Cowan in the New Jersey courts.

(Attached hereto as Exhibit

"C").

30.

On January 12, 1983, appellants Benz and Cowan

filed a certain Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and
Counterclaim

and

to

"Motion to Amend").

Join

Parties

(hereinafter

(Transcript, pp. 200-237).

Appellants'

Mot ion sought to assert,

Additional

for the first time, four counter-

claims against respondents McGregor and Richardson and seven
"counterclaims"
this action.
months

against

parties

Appellants'

not

heretofore

parties

to

Motion was made less than three

prior to the date set for trial and more than two

months after Judge Stein's Order staying the New Jersey
action.
31.
for

hearing

Appellants' Motion to Amend came on regularly
before the

Law and Motion Judge of the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Timothy R.
January

20,

conclusion of

1983.

Hanson presiding, on Thursday,

(Transcript,

said hearing,

pp.

363-364).

Judge Hanson

At

the

took appellants'

Motion under advisement.
32.

On or about March 2, 1983 counsel for respon-

dents and appellants were informed by a telephone call that
- 13 -

appellants'

Motion to Amend had been denied.

Respondents'

counsel was asked to prepare an appropriate Order.
33.
filed

yet

McGregor,
Inc.,

On

March

another
Eldon L.

Buttonwood

3,

1983,

appellants

action naming
Richardson,

Management

II,

Benz

as defendants

and

Cowan

D.

Scott

the McNeil/Mehew Group,

Associates,

Donald

Remlinger,

Peter Caruso, Guy J. Cutuli, Gus DiBiasi, Robert A. DiMizio,
and

Anthony

Zero

in

the Third

Judicial

District Court of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. C-83-1605.

The

Benz and Cowan Complaint of March 3, 1983 (Attached hereto
as

Exhibit

"D"),

sets

forth

those

causes of action

which

appellants Benz and Cowan sought to join in this action
pursuant to their Motion to Amend dated January 12,

1983,

and which are asserted in the New Jersey action.
34.
Hanson

of

County,

On March 7,

the

Third

Amended
Parties.

Judicial

State of Utah,

Defendants Peter A.
Answer and

a

District Court of

Salt

Lake

issued the Order Denying Motion of

Benz and David Cowan for Leave to File
Counterclaim and

(Transcript,

Hanson entered

1983, the Honorable Timothy R.

pp.

363-364).

to Join Additional
In

addition,

Judge

certain Memorandum Decision setting forth

his reasons for the denial of appellants' Motion.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON DID NOT ABUSE
HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM AND TO JOIN
----ADDITIONAL PARTIES
Judge Timothy R.
March

7,

forth

the

1983,

denying

grounds

of

Hanson's Memorandum Decision of

appellants'

Motion to Amend,

the Court's decision

as

An examination of the nature of the
controversy in this matter and the
activities of the parties up to thTS
point in t1me, together with the fact
that on July 7, 1982 Judge Bryant H.
f~£!!L_£!_~his Court, following a
special hearing, set this matter as a
number one setting in April of 1983,
together with the observations of the
Court that defendants' Motion to Amend
and to Join Additional Parties would
raise new issues, delay the long-stand~t rial date, and would seriously
prejudice the plaintiffs in having the
matter heard as scheduled all lead the
Court to the conclusion that the defendants' Motion must be denied, even in
the face of the long-standing rule that
amendments are to be 1 iberally allowed
where justice so requires.
An overall
view of the file and activities, to~ether with this specially set trial
date as above-noted do not lead this
Court to believe that the amendment
should be allowed in that justice does
not so require in this circumstance.
A
weighing of the "interests of justice"
as required by the Rules of Procedure
and taking into account and weighing
the respective hardships of the particular parties all lead this Court to the
- 15 -

sets

follows:

conclusion that defendants' Motion
should be denied, and it is so ordered.
(Transcript, pp. 365-366) (emphasis added).
A review of the facts of this case, together with
the

applicable

case

law,

can only lead

to the conclusion

that Judge Hanson's Memorandum Decision and Order were fully
justified

and

proper

and

did

not

constitute

an

abuse

of judicial discretion.
Rule

15(a),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

erally governs the amendment of pleadings.

gen-

Insofar as Rule

15(a) is pertinent, it provides:

[A] party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of
the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
The granting or denying of a motion to amend pleadings under
the provisions of Rule 15(a) lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Exchange,

Westley v. Farmer's Insurance

663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983); Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah

2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960).
that "[a]

This Court has recently stated

trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend is

not reversible error unless the denial constitutes an abuse
of discretion.
Co., No.

n

Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation,

18203, slip op.

at 2 (Utah filed May 17, 1983)

(citations omitted).
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In construing Rule

lS(a)

of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, which is identical to Utah Rule lS(a), the
united States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178
(1962),

enumerated the following general standard to be

employed by courts in determining whether a motion to amend
should be granted:
If the underlying facts or circumstances
relied on by a [party] may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be
afforded an opportunity to test his
claim on the merits.
In the absence of
any apparent or undeclared reason
such as undu~delay, bad faith or
dilato!:Y motive on the part of the
movant;- repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of the allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. the leave sought
should, as the rules
require, be "freely given."
Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
A court considering a motion to amend must inquire
into

whether

there

has

been

undue delay,

bad

faith

or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, whether the party
opposing the amendment will be prejudiced if the amendment
is allowed,

the reasons for the movant's failing to include

in his original
and

the

denied.

pleading the material sought to be added,

hardship to the moving party if leave to amend is
See,

~,

6

c.

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-

tice and Procedure § 1487 (1971).

Respondents respectfully

submit

and

that

Judge

Hanson's

Order

- 17 -

Memorandum

Decision

denying

appellants'

Motion

to

Amend

exercise of his discretion and

constituted

a

proper

was correct as a matter of

law for the following reasons:
A review of

1.

the history of this lawsuit re-

veals what could only be considered a concerted attempt by
appellants to delay adjudication of the case;
2.

The

granting of

appellants'

Motion

to

Amend

would have raised new issues and resulted in a delay of the
long-established

trial

date,

thereby

prejudicing

failed

to give

respon-

dents;
3.
reasons

Appellants have

justifying their

failure

to include

sufficient

in their ori-

ginal Answers those counterclaims proposed to be asserted by
amendment; and
4.

Any hardship to appellants was caused by their

own acts.
A.

APPELLANTS ENGAGED IN A CONCERTED EFFORT
TO DELAY ADJUDICATION OF OF THIS ACTION
A review of the history of this action as set

forth

in the

considered

a

Statement of
concerted

Facts reveals

attempt

adjudication of this matter.
the point,

what

can only be

by appellants to delay the
While not wishing to belabor

respondents strongly believe that the following
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analysis

demonstrates

appellants'

bad

faith

and

dilatory

motives throughout the history of this action.
Respondents'
1982.

Complaint

was

filed

on January 28,

Appellant David Cowan was served with the Complaint

on January 29, 1982 at the hour of 4:35 p.m.
pg. 15).

(Transcript,

Under the provisions of Rule 12 (a), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Cowan should have filed his Answer to the
Complaint on or before February 18, 1982.

Appellant Cowan

did not file his Answer to respondents' Complaint until
March 29, 1982.

(Transcript, pp. 95-100).

Appellant Peter Benz was served with the Summons
and Complaint in this action on February 1, 1982.
cript, pp.

39-41).

On March 3, 1982, appellant Benz filed

his Motion to Quash Service or,
to Dismiss.

(Trans-

in the Alternative, Motion

(Transcript, pp, 29-30).

By Order of the Third

Judicial District Court dated March 19, 1982, appellant
Benz' Motion was denied.

(Transcript, pp. 94-95).

to that Order of March 19,
ten

1982, defendant Benz was given

(10) days, until March 29, 1982, to file his Answer to

the Complaint.

Appellant Benz did not file his Answer on or

before March 29, 1982.
cial

Pursuant

On April 19, 1982, the Third Judi-

District Court ordered Benz to file his Answer to

plaintiffs' Complaint on or before April 29, 1982.
cript, pg.

117).

Appellant Benz did not do so.

(TransAppellant

Benz did not file his Answer to the Complaint until May 3,
- 19 -

1982,

five

order.

weeks

after

the date

set

the Court's

by

first

(Transcript, pp. 152-154).
On March 18, 1982, respondents gave notice of the

taking of the deposition of Peter A.
Tuesday, April 20, 1982.

Benz scheduled for

(Transcript, pp. 75-76).

Also on

March 18, 1982, respondents served upon counsel for appellant

Benz

Plaintiffs'

Documents.

First

The documents

Request

were

to

be

9:00 a.m. on Monday, April 19, 1982.
for

his

Benz,

deposition

on April

15,

and

producing

1982,

for

Production

produced

of

by Benz at

Rather than appearing

the documents

requested,

four days prior to the date his

documents were to be produced and six days prior to the date
set

for

the

taking of his deposition,

filed

a

Motion

Extension of Time in Which to File Responsive Pleading,

for
in

Which to Respond to Discovery Requests, and for Protective
Order.

On April 19, 1982, the Third Judicial District Court

ordered that Benz be granted an additional ten (10) days to
respond

to

Plaintiffs'

First

Request

for Production of

Documents and that the deposition of appellant Benz be taken
(Transcript, pg.

within twenty days of the Court's Order.
117).

Benz did not produce the documents on April 29, 1982,

as required by the Court.
On
the

taking

March
of

18,

1982,

respondents

the deposition of

- 20 -

served

appellant

David

notice of
Cowan on

Wednesday,

April

21,

1982.

Cowan's

deposition was twice

continued at the request of Cowan's counsel.
On

April

27,

1982,

counsel

for

respondents

received a Notice of Deposition, scheduling the depositions
of D.

Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson,

afternoon of May 13, 1982.
28,

1982,

counsel

Defendant

On April

Benz for Protective Order and Order

Compelling Discovery.

and

(Transcript, p. 118).

for respondents received a Motion of

Peter A.

Motion requested,

II, for the

(Transcript, pp. 119-120).

That

inter alia, that respondents McGregor

Richardson be ordered to appear at the depositions

scheduled for May 13,

1982 and that should they not be

available for their depositions on May 13, 1982, that they
pay the costs and
City,
time

Utah,
Benz'

for

expenses for Benz to come to Salt Lake

the taking of their depositions.

Motion

was made,

At the

there was no indication that

respondents would not appear for the taking of their deposit ions on May 13, 1982.

Benz' Motion was apparently made for

the sole purpose of harassing and annoying respondents.
Accordingly, on May 3, 1982, Judge David B. Dee of the Third
Judicial District Court denied Benz' Motion for Protective
Order and Order Compelling Discovery.
On May 4, 1982, notwithstanding the filing of the
meritless

Motion to Compel

Discovery,

counsel

for

respon-

dents received a certain Notice of Continuance of Taking of
- 21 -

Depositions

from

counsel

for

Benz,

continuing

the deposi-

tions of D. Scott McGregor and Eldon L. Richardson, II, from
May 13, 1982, to May 17, 1982.

On May 17, 1982, Benz and

his counsel of record advised that they were continuing
without date respondents'

depositions.

The depositions of

respondents were not taken by counsel for Benz until January
of 1983, more than seven months after the date on which Benz
sought

to

compel

respondents'

On May 3,

attendance

by

Court order.

1982, defendant Peter A.

Benz finally

filed his Answer to respondents' Complaint.

On May 3, 1982,

appellants Benz and Cowan also filed their Complaint in the
New Jersey action.
filed

Appellants admit that the complaint

in the state courts of New Jersey is virtually iden-

tical to the counterclaims which appellants sought leave of
the Third Judicial District Court to add to their Answers in
their Motion to Amend dated January 12, 1983.
!ant's Brief, pp.

(See Appel-

The only apparent purpose for the

7-8).

filing of the New Jersey action was to harass and annoy
respondents

and

to

force

them

to

simultaneously

litigate

their claims in two separate forums.
On May 17,

1982,

Benz and his counsel of record

made the representation to respondents'

counsel that an

offer of settlement would be made by Benz "within a reasonable period of time."

(Affidavit of LeRoy S. Axland, dated

July 6, 1982, Transcript, p. 182).
- 22 -

No offer of settlement

was

subsequently made.

On

June

21,

1982,

counsel

for

respondents contacted then-counsel for Benz by telephone to
inquire

as

to

the offer of settlement.

At

that

time,

counsel for Benz advised respondents' counsel that Benz was
seeking

to

Affidavit

change
of

LeRoy

Utah
S.

counsel
Axland,

in

this proceeding.

dated

July 6,

1982,

(See
Trans-

cript, p. 183).
For these reasons, respondents filed a Motion for
Expedited Trial Setting on June 21, 1982.
motion

was

subsequently denied,

Judge

Although the

Bryant

H.

Croft

of

the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah,

set this matter for trial on a

setting in April of 1983.

firm first place

(Transcript, p. 187).

Subsequent to July 7, 1982, appellants can hardly
be said to have vigorously pursued discovery in this action.
On the contrary, the sole discovery undertaken by appellants
was the service of Defendant Peter A.

Benz's First Request

for Production of Documents Directed to Plaintiffs on August
18,

1982,

(Transcript,

pp.

188-191), and the taking of

respondents' depositions during January, 1983.
On November 4, 1982, Judge Arnold M. Stein of the
Superior Court of New Jersey entered his Order Staying
Action on Condition in the action filed by Benz and Cowan in
the New Jersey courts.
months,

Appellants then delayed for over two

until January 12,

1983, before filing their Motion
- 23 -

to Amend.

Appellants do

their Motion

by Judge

and

the

delayed

not

Hanson

dispute that
would

trial date.

have

Indeed,

the granting of

raised

new

appellants

issues
state:

•Appellants concede that the granting of the Motion for
Leave to File an Amended Answer both would have raised new
issues and delayed the trial date.•

(Appellants' Brief, pp.

21-22).
Given the history of this litigation,
unreasonable
Motion

for

it was not

Judge Hanson to conclude that appellants'

to Amend was made in bad faith and with a dilatory

motive.

Indeed,

Judge

Hanson so found

when he

stated:

An overall view of the file and activities, together with the specially set
trial date as above-noted do not lead
this Court to believe that the amendment
should be allowed in that justice does
not so require in this circumstance.
(Memorandum Decision, p. 2, Transcript, p. 366).
The

record

in

Hanson

this
that

case

amply supports a

appellants'

deter-

mination

by Judge

Motion

to Amend

was made

in bad faith and with a dilatory motive.

Accord-

ingly, Judge Hanson's denial of appellants' Motion to Amend
was not an abuse of discretion and must be affirmed.

- 24 -

B.

THE GRANTING OF APPELLANTS' MOTION TO
AMEND WOULD HAVE RAISED NEW ISSUES
AND-RES-ULTED-INADELAYOFTHETRIAL
DATE THEREBY PREJUDICING RESPONDENTS
Appellants have conceded that the granting of

their Motion to Amend would have raised new issues and
delayed

the

trial date.

(Appellants'

Brief,

pp.

21-22).

Appellants further state that • [s]ome inconvenience may have
been

imposed upon

plaintiffs

if the

their claims had been delayed."
Appellants
"minimal•

argue,
when

however,

compared

to

time for adjudicating

(Appellants' Brief, p. 7).

that
the

that

inconvenience

prejudice

that

is

appellants

would suffer if their compulsory counterclaims were not
allowed

to be tried in this case.

(Appellants'

Brief,

p. 7).

While
appeal,

such

an

argument

may have

some

surface

it ignores a long line of cases holding that it

is the denial of a

speedy and

inexpensive adjudication of

the non-movant' s claims to which the courts look in determining

whether

prejudiced.

the

party opposing

the motion to amend

is

The "prejudice" of a party opposing a Motion to

Amend "is not that occasioned by defeat on the merits, but
rather the inconvenience and delay suffered when the amendment

raises new issues or

litigation."
1186,

1188

Romo v. Reyes,

(1976).

inserts new parties into the
26

Ariz.

App.

374,

548

P.2d

See also Williams v. United States, 405
-

25 -

F.2d

234

(5th Cir.

1968);

Kuris v. Pepper Poultry Company,

Inc., 2 F.R.D. 361, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
A review of appellants'
shows

that

the

issues raised

proposed

counterclaim

therein go far

beyond

the

enforceability of the Compensation Agreement of December 3,
1981.

If Judge Hanson had granted appellants'

would

have

been

necessary

particularly with

respect

to

to

redepose

the

issues

the
set

Motion,

it

appellants,
forth

in

the

Fourth through Seventh Counts of the proposed counterclaim.
Additional
gone

to

discovery,

trial

as

unnecessary

scheduled on the

respondents'

Complaint,

Specifically,

the depositions of

persons

for

associated

with

would

BMC

need

the

issues as
to

to

have

framed

by

have been taken.

Donald Remlinger

Acquisition

have needed to have been taken.

matter

and

Corporation

all

would

Under such circumstances,

the courts have not hesitated to deny eleventh-hour motions
to amend.
In

Idaho First National Bank v. Wells,

100

Idaho

256, 596 P.2d 429 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the
decision of a trial court in denying defendants' motion to
amend

their

amendment
filing
set

answer

was

to

proposed

join

trial.

third-party defendant.

approximately

of the complaint and

for

a

two

years

after

The
the

five months prior to the date

In so holding,

stated:
- 26 -

the

Idaho Supreme Court

The trial court stated that "the granting of defendants' motion at this late
stage of the proceedings would complicate and delay the principal action and
impose an unwarranted hardship on
plaintiff . . . "We agree with the trial
court's analysis of the consequences of
allowing the amendment and therefore
hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying appellants'
motion to amend their complaint [sic] to
add a third party defendant.
596 P.2d at 434 (emphasis added).
In
Inc.,

Morgan Brothers, Inc. v. Haskell Corporation,

24 wash. App. 773, 604 P.2d 1294 (1979), the washing-

ton Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion

in denying a motion to amend five weeks

before trial absent a showing of why a third-party defendant
was not brought in prior to such time and where the amendment

would

have delayed

the trial of the case.

See also

Cherokee National Life Insurance Company v. Coastal Bank of
Georgia,
abuse

238 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. 1977)

its discretion

(the trial court did not

in denying leave to file third-party

complaint where such leave was sought more than nine months
after suit was commenced); Cowman v. Lavine,
(Iowa 1975)
mot ion

to

motion

was

(the denial by the trial

amend
not

was

not

filed

an

until

234 N.W.2d 114

court of defendants'

abuse of discretion where the
nine months after suit was

commenced and was made subsequent to the taking of deposit ions,

the f i 1 ing of an answer,

- 27 -

and a pre-trial conference

at which a specific trial date was set);
Utilities,
tiffs'

53 N.M.

452,

210 P.2d

938

Hogue v. Superior

(1949)

(where plain-

motion to join additional party as a defendant was

not made until late in the case, there was not an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial

court

in denying the

motion).
In DeBry v. Transamerica Corporation, 601 F.2d 480
(10th Cir.

1979), plaintiffs sought damages from defendant

Transamerica Corporation for alleged fraud in a transaction
involving an exchange of stock.

After the

filing of two

amended Complaints, plaintiffs moved again, eighteen months
after

the

filing of their original Complaint and three

months prior to trial, to again amend their Complaint.
proposed

Third

recovery and,

Amended

Complaint

alleged

new

The

theories of

if granted, would possibly have resulted in a

postponement of the trial.

The United States District Court

for

Central Division,

the

Aldon

District of Utah,

Anderson presiding,

J.

File Third Amended Complaint.

denied

the Honorable

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

The case thereafter proceeded

to trial and a jury verdict was returned in favor of defendant

Transamerica.

leging,

Thereafter,

appealed,

al-

inter alia, error by the trial court in denying

plaintiffs' Motion to Amend.
the

plaintiffs

trial

court,

In upholding the decision of

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
- 28 -

plaintiffs'
denial.

Motion and that good reason existed for the

In so holding, the Court stated:
First, the case had been on file for
eighteen months.
The trial setting was
three months off.
The tendered complaint brought in new concepts and
theories which created a hazard that
postponement of trial would be necessary. The court reasoned that:
The interest of fairness and
justice to both parties are
best served at this st.age of
the case by avoiding the
additional discovery and trial
preparation which the different causes of action would
require.
The additional
causes of action which
the plaintiffs seek to include
by this amendment do not
represent new areas of the law
that could not have been
developed further and incorporated in this cause of
action at an.earlier date.
It would thus appear that the trial
court was of the opinion that there had
been ample time for the plaintiffs to
develop the concepts and theories
embodied in the amended complaint since
they did not represent new areas of the
law.
It cannot be said, therefore, that
the trial court acted in an unreasonable
or arbitrary manner.

601 F.2d at 492.
In the case at bar, granting appellants' Motion to
0

Amend would have required additional extensive discovery and
preparation and greatly added to the trial time involved to
the detriment of a speedy resolution of the case,

- 29 -

thereby

unduly prejudicing respondents.

Thus, Judge Hanson's Order

and Memorandum Decision of March 7,

1983, were proper, did

not constitute an abuse of judicial discretion and must be
affirmed.
C.

APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO JUSTIFY THEIR
FAILURE TO ASSERT THEIR COUNTERCLAIMS
UPON THE FILING OF THEIR ANSWERS
Appellants argue that the prejudice to respondents

because of a postponement of the trial date "is minimal
compared to the permanent prejudice sustained by the defendants if their compulsory counterclaims are not allowed to
be tried in this action."

(Appellants' Brief, p.

7).

The

fact that the amendments that appellants sought were for the
purpose of asserting compulsory counterclaims does not,
however,

ipso facto

justify allowing the amendment, parti-

cularly when it would result in a delay of the long-est ablished trial date.
Rule

13(a),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

vides in pertinent part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's
claim .
(Emphasis added).

-

30 -

pro-

On March
Cowan

1982, the date upon which appellant
and on May 3,

1982, the date upon

which appellant Benz filed his Answer,

the appellants knew

of,

filed

29,

and

his Answer,

could

have asserted,

the claims which

formed

basis of their Motion to Amend dated January 12, 1983.

the
This

is conclusively shown by reason of the fact that on May 3,
1982, more than eight months prior to their Motion to Amend,
appellants

filed

their New Jersey action asserting essen-

tially the very claims which they sought to add to this
action by amendment.

Having failed to properly assert their

compulsory counterclaims when they filed their Answers,
appellants

could

seek

to

assert

their

counterclaims only

under the provisions of Rule 13(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Rule 13(e) provides:
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when
justice requires, he may by leave of
court set up the counterclaim by
amendment.
Respondents

failed

before

the

respectfully

District

Court,

submit
and

that

have

appellants

failed

before

this Court, to justify their failure to assert the counterclaims and to join the additional parties upon the filing of
their original

Answers.

A review of the history of this

litigation to date, as extensively set forth above, can only
lead to the conclusion that appellants sought to gain a
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strategic advantage in this litigation by filing the parallel

action

in

the

state courts of

New Jersey rather than

asserting their counterclaims in the

instant case.

Having

been ordered by the New Jersey court to attempt to seek
relief

in

months

before

District

this

Court

action,

belatedly petitioning
to

other amendments.
does

not

appellants waited more

allow

their

the Third

proposed

than two
Judicial

counterclaims

and

Such action on the part of the appellants

constitute

oversight,

inadvertence

or

excusable

neglect.
Appellants Benz and Cowan agree that the counterclaims which they sought to assert in their Motion to Amend
are the same that they asserted in their New Jersey action.
(Appellants' Brief, pp.

7-8).

The courts have consistently

denied leave to amend when the moving party knew about the
facts on which the proposed amendment was based but omitted
the

necessary

allegations

from

the

original

See Larson v. Arnold E. Verdi Trucking, Inc.,

pleading.

28 F.R.D.

377

(E.D. Pa. 1961); Singer Manufacturing Company v. Shepard, 13
F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kuris v. Pepper Poultry Company,
Inc., 2 F.R.D.

361 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) Cf. Dow Corning Corpora-

tion v. General Electric Company, 461 F. Supp. 519 (N.D.N.Y.
1978).
In Ralston-Purina Company v. Bertie, 541 F.2d 1363
(9th Cir.

1976), the United States Court of Appeals for the
- 32 -

Ninth

Circuit

upheld

an order of

the

trial

court denying

defendants' motion for leave to assert an omitted compulsory
counterclaim.

The Court found no abuse of discretion on the

part of the trial court where defendants' motion contained
no

allegations

of

newly discovered

evidence

establishing,

for the first time, that they had a compulsory counterclaim,
and where the motion was made six months after the filing of
the answer and two months after a pre-trial conference.
Indeed,
ance Exchange,

this Court,

in Westley v. Farmer's Insur-

663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983), held that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying a plaintiff's
motion to amend his complaint where the amendment would have
delayed

the

trial

and the substance of plaintiff's new

allegation was known a
plaintiff, on April 23,
In the first count,
breached

its

full

year earlier.

In Westley,

1980, filed a two count complaint.

plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had

contract

with

him.

In

the

second count,

plaintiff alleged that Farmer's had defamed him.

De po-

sitions were taken and in November, 1981, Farmer's moved for
summary

judgment

on

both

counts.

Shortly

thereafter,

plaintiff retained new counsel who immediately moved for a
continuance

of

the

trial

scheduled

for

January

Plaintiff also moved to amend his complaint to
allegation

that

Farmer's

13,

1982.

include an

had maliciously removed

his name

from the list of Farmer's Insurance agents in the telephone
- 33 -

directory.

The

trial

court

denied

plaintiff's

Motion

to

Amend.
On appeal,

plaintiff Westley

contended

that

the

trial court erred in not allowing him to amend his complaint.

In upholding the decision of the lower court, this

Court stated:
On the facts presented, we are not
convinced that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to grant the
requested leave to amend.
An amendment
would certainly have delayed the trial
and the substance of plaintiff's new
allegation was known a full year earlier
when plaintiff discussed it in his
deposition.
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, as in Westley, there is no
dispute that had the Third Judicial District Court granted
appellants' Motion to Amend it would "certainly have delayed
the trial."

Moreover,

the factual basis of appellants'

proposed counterclaims against McGregor and Richardson were
known to appellants at least as of May 3,

1982, more than

eight months earlier, when appellants filed their New Jersey
action.

As in Westley, the present case does not involve an

abuse of discretion

i~

Judge Timothy R. Hanson's denial of

appellants' Motion to Amend.
While
apparently
assert

argue

their

it

is

that

not

altogether

the reason

clear,

they did

compulsory counterclaims prior
- 34 -

not

appellants
attempt

to

to January of

1983

is

that by

so doing appellant Benz would have waived

his objection to the Third Judicial District Court's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over him.
without merit for two reasons.

This argument is

First, it ignores the fact

that there is no question that the Third Judicial District
Court

had

in

personam

appellant Cowan.
counterclaims
Second,

jurisdiction over

Cowan' s

the

person

of

failure to assert the compulsory

at an earlier date

is

entirely unjustified.

with respect to appellant Benz, the assertion of a

compulsory counterclaim does not waive an objection to the
jurisdiction of a

court.

Professors Wright and Miller in

their treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure state:
The general rule is that the assertion
of a compulsory counterclaim by defendant does not constitute a waiver of any
objections he might have to the court's
personal jurisdiction over him or its
venue .
6

c.

s

1409

Wright & A. Miller,
(1971).

Federal Practice and Procedure

See also Dragor Shipping Corporation v.

Union Tank Car Company,

378

F.2d

241,

244

(9th

Cir.

1967)

("[S]ince . . . a party has no alternative but to submit his
compulsory counterclaim against an opposing party, or lose
it, his act in asserting it does not constitute a waiver of
any

jurisdictional

asserts.");

defense

he

previously

or

concurrently

Hasse v. American Photograph Corporation,

- 35 -

299

F.2d

666,

669

(10th

Cir.

Company (Libya) Ltd.,

1962);

492 F. Supp.

Hunt v. BP Exploration
885,

895-896 (N.D. Texas

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Thompson,

1980);

80 F.

Supp. 570, 574 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
Because appellants did not and could not show
oversight,

inadvertence or excusable neglect in failing

to file their proposed counterclaims prior to January, 1983,
as

required

by Rule 13(e)

of the

Utah Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure, coupled with the fact that appellants knew about the
"facts" on which their proposed counterclaims were based no
later than May 3,

1982,

denied

Motion

appellants'

must therefore find,

Judge Timothy R.
to Amend.

Hanson correctly

This Honorable Court

as a matter of law, that Judge Hanson

did not abuse his discretion in denying appellants'

Motion

to Amend.
D.

ANY PREJUDICE TO APPELLANTS HAS BEEN
CAUSED BY THEIR OWN ACTS
Appellants

they

sought

argue

to assert

that

against

because

the

counterclaims

respondents were

compulsory

counterclaims, Judge Hanson abused his discretion in denying
their

Motion

acknowledge,
were
Cowan

to

however,

compulsory
filed

Amend.

on

What

appellants

fail

to candidly

is that their proposed counterclaims
March

his Answer

29,

in the

- 36 -

1982,

the

date

instant action,

appellant
and were

likewise compulsory on May 3, 1982, the date appellant Benz
filed

his

Answer

to

respondents'

Complaint.

Rather

than

filing their compulsory counterclaims, appellants sought to
gain a strategic advantage by bringing a separate action in
the state courts of New Jersey in which appellant Benz is a
member of the Bar.
The New Jersey action was subsequently stayed on
November

4,

1982.

The stay of the New Jersey action did

not, however, miraculously transform the claims asserted by
the appellants in the New Jersey action into compulsory
counterclaims which had to be asserted in the Utah action.
The counterclaims were compulsory counterclaims on March 29,
1982, May 3, 1982 and in January, 1983.
Moreover,

notwithstanding

the stay of the New

Jersey proceedings on November 4, 1982, appellants did not
seek

to

amend

their Answers

in

the

instant

case until

January 12, 1983, over two months after the stay of the New
Jersey proceedings, thus necessitating a delay of the trial
of

this

problems

action
which

if their Motion had
appellants

face

in

the

problems solely of their own making.
and

consistently

act ion,

as well

correctly held,

attempted

to

been granted.
instant

delay discovery

based on the record

37 -

are

They have repeatedly

as to delay the trial date.

-

action

The

in

this

Judge Hanson

in this case,

that

appellants'

Motion to Amend should be denied.

This Court

should likewise deny appellants' Appeal and affirm the Order
and Memorandum Decision dated March 7, 1983.

POINT II
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS IN THE NEW JERSEY
ACTION SHOULD NOT ESTOP THEM FROM
oi>P0s!N"G-APPELLANTS1 -M"6Trm:lroRI:E"AvET6
FILE AN AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
AND TO JOIN ADDITIONAL PARTIES
Appellants argue that by reason of the representations made by respondents to the New Jersey court regarding
the

staying

of

the

New Jersey

action,

respondents

should

have been estopped to argue that the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, should not allow
appellants' Motion to Amend.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 7-10).

This argument is made without the citation of any authority
and is based solely upon the arguments made by respondents
in the New Jersey action.
The Brief in Support of Motion to Stay on Behalf
of

Eldon

L.

Richardson,

II,

D.

Scott

McGregor,

Donald

Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. was filed in the New
At the time the arguments

Jersey action on July 16, 1982.
set

forth

therein

were made,

respondents

in good

faith

believed that the New Jersey action should have been stayed
and that parallel litigation in two disparate forms was

- 38 -

1inwise,

constituted

a

waste of

inconvenient to the parties.
that

for

the

unnecessary

judicial resources and was
Respondents further believed

New Jersey action
duplication

of

to go

forward

discovery,

would cause

litigation,

and

constitute annoyance and harassment of the respondents.
appellants had done as they should have done compulsory

counterclaims when

they

filed

If

filed their

their Answers

in

the instant case - the New Jersey action would not have been
brought

in

the

first

instance.

Respondents were fully

justiifed in opposing appellants' Motion to Amend.
Appellants Cowan

and

Benz consciously chose a

litigation strategy of vexation and harassment in bringing
their

New Jersey action.

stayed,

When

the New Jersey action was

appellants belatedly petitioned the Third Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to allow
them

to

assert

claims which

should have

been

asserted

in

March and May of 1982.

When the lower court refused to

allow

to

appellants'

decision

to

Motion

Amend,

appellants

be an abuse of discretion and

claim

appeal

that

to this

Court to rescue them from a situation of their own making.
Neither the law nor any known concept of "justice" requires
this Court to untie appellants' Gordian knot.
The Order
1983,

and Memorandum Decision of March

7,

entered by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the

- 39 -

Third Judicial District Court nf Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, must be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set
affirm

the

Timothy

R.

Order

and

Hanson of

forth above,

this Court must

Memorandum Decision of
the Third

Judicial

the

Honorable

District Court of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying appellants' Motion
for Leave to File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to
Join Additional Parties.
DATED this

!id

day of September, 1983.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON

LeROY

s/

AXLAND, Esq.

SEN, Esq.
for Respondents
Leaming Office Center
West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Telephone:
( 801) 532-7300
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies

of the foregoing Respondents' Brief were hand-delivered this

~day

of September, 1983 to:
Merlin 0. Baker, Esq.
John A. Adams, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996

-

41 -

(
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E.l'u'JD DELIVERED
Bruce Findlay, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNEL~
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

D--Scott McGregor, et al. v. Peter A.
Benz, et al.

Dear Bruce:
The purpose of this letter is to confirn the substance
of our telephone conference of Monday, April 19, 1982. At
t:'1at time you informed me that the documents requested pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Request for Production of Documents Directed to Defendant David Cowan were not available
for inspection and copying on April 19, 1982, as required by
said Request.
You also inforr.-.ed me that it was unlikely
t!"lat Mr. Cowan would be available for the taking of his
deposition on April 21, 1982, pursuant to the Notice of
Deposi~ion dated March 19, 1982.
Rather than go through the time and expense of filing
a Motion to Compel Discovery, it was agreed that you would
provide all documents requested pursu~~t to the Request
for Production of Documents dated March 19, 1982, at 10:00
a.m. on Friday, April 23, 1982.
You further agreed to make
yo'.lr client, Mr. Cowan, available for the taking of his
deposition at 10:00 a.rn. o~ Tuesday, April 27, 1982.
Accordingly, you will find enclosed a copy bf a ~otice of
Continuance of Deposition, =ontinuing the deposition of
David Cowan u:-itil 10:00 a.r:-. on April 27, 1982.
I trust that all docur..ents will be produced on Friday,
April 2 3, and that Mr. Cowa...-i will present himself for the

EXHIBIT "A"

Bruce Findlay, Esq.
J..;nll 20, 1982
Page two

taking of his depositon on April 27.
Should you have any
questions or concerns, please feel free to contact ~eat any
time.
Very truly yours,

& HANSON

JMP.:cc
Enclosure

\..::.
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j
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LASSER. HCiC"HMAN u11e>.-11c. r..11C>Yf11J ANr'I i<IJSll.!~.;
A Pr-ofession11 Corporation
200 Executive Drive
West Orange, New Jersey 0?052

(20i) i31·9000

Attor-neys for Plaintiff
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JE~SEY
CHANCERY DIVISION: MORRIS COUt"TY
DOCKET NO.
PETER A. BENZ Ind
DAVID COWAN,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action

-vsELDON L. RICHARDSON, 111;
D. SCOTT McGREGOR;
DONALD REMLINGER;
McNEIL/MEHEW GROUP 1 INC.,
1 Utah corpor1tion; and
BMC ACQUISITION CORPORATION,
a New York corpor-1tlon, d/b/a
BUTTONWOOD MANAGEMENT CO.,

COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, PETER A. BENZ, having his principal place of
business at 8 Court Str-eet, Morristown, New Jersey, and DAVID COWAN,
having his principal place of business at 140 West 90'th South, Sindy,
Utah, by w1y of complaint ag1inst defend1nu, say:

EXHIBIT "B"

FIRST COUNT
1.

Pla1ntltt Peter A. Benz, ("Benz") Is 1 resident oft.he

Sute of New Jersey in the business, 1mong other things, of 1rr1nging
sources of funding for various fin1ncial ind business ventures.

z.

Plaintiff David Cowan ("Cowin") is 1 resident of the Stlte

Utah and is in business, 1mong other things, 11 1 fin1nci1I broker

o~

1r,o real es Ute developer.

3.

De~enc1nts

~ldon

L. Rich1rdson, Ill, ("Rich1rdson") 1nd

Sec:: McGregor, ( "MrGregor") ire ,.esidents of the State o~ Ut1h.
4.

Defend1!"lt Donald Remlinge,., ( 'Remlinge,.") is 1 resident

tne Sti:t of Ne .. Jersey, ,.esiding at 6,.ig1de Hill Road, Mo,.ris Town•

o~

ship, New Je,.sey.
5.
er.

in~c,.mation

Defend1rt McNeil/Mehe .. Gr-t>up, Inc:. ("McNeil/Mel'lew") is,
and belief, a Utah co,.poration with p,.incip1I places of

business in Utah and Ne,. Yorlc

Defe'"ldants Rich1rdson, McG,.ego,. 1nd

Remlinge,. ire, on info,.m1tion and belief, officers, p,.incip1ls 1nd/or
contr-ol I ing shar-eholders of McNei l/Mel'lew.

6.

Defendant BMC Acquisition Corporation, d/b/a Buttonwood

Management Co., ("6unonwood") is, on infor-mation 1nd belief, I

New

Yor-. cor-poration of which defendant Remlinger is, also on info~tion
anc bel 1ef, an officer, pr-incipal and/or contr-tllling shareholder.
7.

Sometime in October or November i981, Ricl'lar-dson 1nd

McGregor 1ppl'"tlached Cowan concerning possible sour-ces of funding for
1

proposed business ventur-e.

·Z-

B.

In lite November 1981 Cowan c:.onucted Benz, a business

acqu1inunce, c:.oncerning the plans of Rich1rdson and McGregor.
lndi~ted ~1t

Benz

he might be Interested In Investing himself and might also

be 1ble to obUin other investors.
9.

Cowan relayed this information to Richl!'"dson and McG,.egor,

who expl"essed their intel"est in meeting with, and doing business with,
Senz in the State of New Jel"sey.
10.

On Novembe!'" 24, 1981, Remlinger and other rei=ll"esentives

of sunonwood met with Senz and Cowan at Canoe Brook Country Club,
Summit, New Jersey, to discuss all aspects of a proposal where!:ly
Bunonwood would invest in the business ventul"e in c;uestion.
11.

On or about December 3, 1981, Richardson and McGregol"

met with Senz and Cowan at Benz's offices in Mol"l'"istcwn, New Jersey.
At that meeting Senz advised Richll"dson and McGl"egor that he had
interested two potential investment Ql"Oups in participating in the pro·
posed business venture.

12.

The first of these groups involved West Bridge Street

Corporation, a New Jersey corporation of which Senz is pr-esident and
principal shal"eholder.

Under the terms of

~is

al"l"angement West Bridge

Stl"eet Corpor11tion would enter into a joint ventul"e with Mc:Neil/Mehew,
1

c:.orporation to be formed with Richardson and McGl"egol" as the antici·

pated pl"incipals.

The terms of this ll"rangement were embodied in ~e

Lener of intent duly executed ~at day, a true c:.opy of wl"lich is attached
hel"eto as Exhibit 1 and incorpol"ated by reference her-ein.

13.

The ncond Ql"QUP contacted by Benz principally involved

Fiemlin;er and/or Buttonwood.

Benz and Cowan expressly conditioned

the arran;inQ of any meetinQ with Remlin;er upon the a;reement of
Richardson and McGregor, in advance, that In the event Richardson and
MrGregor and/or McNeil/Mehew entered Into an agreement with Remlin;er
and/or Buttonwood, Benz and Cowan would receive as compensation for
their efforts $250,000 in cash and a fifteen percent (15%) interest in
any company formed.

Richardson end McGregor expressly agreed to

these conditions.
14.

On that same day, while still In New Jersey, Benz, Cowan,

Richardson ;;nc McGre;or entered into
the terms set forth above.
hereto as Exhibit 2 and
15.

21

wrinen egreement embodying

A true copy of this agreement is atUched

in~r;:>orated

by refel"'enc.e hel"'ein.

On December 3, 1981, the meeting with Remlinger was

held as scheduled.

Remlinger at all relevant times had notice of the

tel"'ms of the a;reement atuched hereto as Exhibit
16.

z.

Immediately followinQ the meetinQ Richardson and McGregor

!"'epresented to Benz and Cowan that they were not interested in entering
into an arran;ement with Remlinger and would instead pursue the terms
of the letter of intent atuched hel"'eto as Exhibit 1.
17.

Notwithsundin; such l"'epl"'esentation, Richardson and

McGregor subsequently, without notice tc plaintiffs, entel"'ed into an
a!"'!"'angement with RemllnQe!"' and/or Buttonwood Co. pursuant to which,
on information and belief, all pal"'ties became principals In Mc:Neil/Mehew.

-4-

is.
1nd

Notwlthsunding suc:h arrangements defendants have failed

refused to comply with the agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

ihe moneury value of the

is

percent share In the venn.ire ls Incapable

of calculation.
i9.

Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

WHEREFORE plaintiffs demand judgment against all defendants:
i.

For specific: performance of the agreemen't atuc:hed

here~o

u Exhibit 2.
2.

For compensatory and punitive damages.

3.

For

4.

For suc:h

~sts

of suit.
othe~

relief as the Court deems just a:-id pr:;ar.
SECOND COUNi

1.

The allegations of the First Count are repeated as if set

forth at length herein.
2.

As a result of the aforementioned conduct defendants have

been, and will continue to be, unjustly enriched at the expense of plain·
tiffs.
3.

Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

WHEREFORE plaintiffs demAnd judgment against all defendants:
i .

For the imposition of

1

c:onstruc:tive trust on any and all

profits earned by defendants pursuant to the arrangement among them.
2.

For an accounting.

3.

For costs of suit.

4.

For suc:h other relief as the Court deems Just and p~per.

THIRD COUNT

i.
u

The allegations of the Fll"st and Second Counts •re r-epeated

If set for-th at length hel"ein.

2.

The actions of Remllnge,. and Buttonwood rn1liciously 1nd

without justification caused Richal"dson and McGregcr to bre•ch the
ag,.eement with plaintiffs attached hereto IS Exhibit 2.
3.

Plaintiffs wculd have eal"ned substantial profits from the

perfcl"mance of the afo,.ementioned aQ,.eement.
WHE.REi=ORE plaintiffs dema:"ld judgmen-: as;Ji:'ls: C!fe:-:::2r.ts
Remlinge,. and Buttonwood:

1.

Fol" compensatol"y and punitive damages.

2.

Fol" costs of suit.

3.

Fo,. such othel" relief as the Court deems just and proper.
FOURTH COUNT

1.

The allegations of the First, Second and Third Counts are

repeated as if set forth at length hel"ein.

2.

Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of pr-ospective

economic advanuge from their participation in eithel" the 1rr1ngernent
atUched hereto as Exhibit 1 or the al"rangement atuched hereto as
Exhibit 2.
3.

The actions of defendants hel"ein jointly and severally

intel"fel"ed, maliciously and without justification, with plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of prospective economic advantage.
WHEREFORE plaintiffs demand judgment against •II defendants:

1.

Fol" compensatory •nd punitive d1m1ges.

-6-

2.

For c.osts of suit.

3.

For suc:h other r-elief u the Cour-t deems just ind proper.

""s:::1"·~~ f&V

LASSER, HOCHMAN, MARCUS,
GURYAN AND KUSKIN
A

BY:
DAIE.;:):

:..;:=i! 30, 1982

P16E E
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SHE.?P~RD A.

GURUN

€1 LED
NOV 5 i982

I:

\!
/i

cu

PITNEY. H•R01N. K11>1>

.

£. Szuc..i

.AIU>IOlD Al. STf:N J.1

WITH c.

0RIGllJ41. FILED
AA O~ THE SUP~Olt COURT

1e3 MA0150N AVENUE:

P o eox 2ooeR
MOICPRtSTOWN

N

.J

07980

12011 2e7-3333

ATTO,..,.<•s F'o• Defendants
Eldon L. Richardson, II,
D. Scott McGregor, Donald
Remlinger and McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc.

·'I
.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
CHANCERY DIVISION - MORRIS COUNTY
DOCKET NO. C-3221-Bl

!

'

PETER.A. BENZ and
DAVID COWAN,
Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Civil Action

ELDON L. RICHARDSON, II:
D. SCOTT McGREGOR; DONALD
REMLINGER; McNEIL/MEHEW GROUP,
INC., a Utah corporation; and
BMC ACQUISITION CORPORATION, a
New York corporation, d/b/a
BUTTONWOOD MANAGEMENT CO.,

ORDER STAYING ACTION
ON CONDITION._, ;.~

'::...-t:_ i
.WAS1
.. I

Defendants.

This matter having been opened to the Court by Pitney,
Hardin·, Kipp

&

Szuch, attorneys for defendants Eldon L.

Richardson, II, D. Scott McGregor, Donald Remlinger and McNeil/
Mehew Group, Inc.

(Frederick L. Whitmer, Esq. appearing), and on

EXHIBIT "C"

the motion of Carl M. Kuntz, attorney for defendant BMC Acquisition Corporation (Michael E. Greene, Esq., of counsel, appearing)i
and in the present of Lasser, Hochman, Marcus, Guryan and Kuskin'
attorneys for plaintiffs Peter A. Benz and David Cowan (Sheppard
A. Guryan, Esq. appearing), and for the reasons set forth on the
record October 22, 1982, and good cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS on this

'f'/1.

day of

Ju...,_

.(~v..J

, 1982

ORDERED that this action be and the same hereby is
stayed as to all proceedings pending the

disposition~of

an action

in the courts of the State of Utah entitled D. Scott McGregor and
Eldon L. Richardson, II v. Peter A. Benz and David Cowan, Civil
No. 382-727, on condition that Donald Remlinger not contest the
exercise of jurisdiction over him by the courts of Utah in

a~y

claim asserted by the defendants here and arisi-ng out of the
same transactions and occurrences in issue in this or that action
and

- ·_

;~·.. ; ..:i.;~,~~~

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion of BMC Acquisitio
Corporation and Buttonwood Management Co. to dismiss this action
for lack of in personam jurisdiction shall also be stayed; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the defendants

I

in the Utah action assert a claim naming as a defendant there any

1:

of the defendants named here over whom ~he Utah court determines

Ji

it has no @!:: pe;sona111 jurisdiction, leave is given to any party

!I

on notice in accordance with the Rules Governing the Courts of

1:

I

-2-

the State of

Ne~

Jersey to move to dissolve the stay granted

herein for good cause shown, provided, however, that nothing

in this Order shall be deemed to permit any party automatically
to dissolve this stay.

ARNOLD M. STEIN 1 J.S.C.

PAPERS CONSIDERED:
Notice of Motion
Movant's Affidavits
Movant's Brief
Answering Affidavits
Answering Brief
Cross-Motion
Movant's Reply
Other

I
1:

I'
I

i

MERLIN o. BAKER and
JOHN A. ADAMS of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Peter A. Benz
and David Cowan
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1996
Telephone:
(801) 532-1500

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
----00000---PETER A. BENZ and DAVID COWAN,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

v.
D. SCOTT McGREGOR, ELDON L.
RICHARDSON, II, THE McNEIL/MEBEW
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation;
BUTTONWOOD MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES,
a New York general partnership;
DONALD REMLINGER; PETER CARUSO;
GUY J. CUTULI: GUS DI BIASI;
ROBERT A. DI MIZIO; and ANTHONY
ZERO;

Civil No.

~ -

'?3-1q. ce;-

Defendants.
----ooOoo----

Plaintiffs, Peter A. Benz and David Cowan, for their
Complaint against the defendants, allege as follows:
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EXHIBIT "D"

(

FIRST COUNT
1.

Plaintiff Peter A. Benz ("Benz"), is a resident of

the State of New Jersey who is in the business, among other
things, of arranging sources of funding for various financial and
business ventures.
2.

Plaintiff David Cowan ("Cowan"), is a resident of the

State of Utah and is in business, among other things, as a
financial broker and real estate developer.
3.

Defendants Eldon L. Richardson, II ("Richardson"), and

D. Scott MC'Gregor ("MC'Gregor"), are residents of the State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Donald Remlinger ("Remlinger"),

is a resident of the State of New Jersey, residing at Brigade Hill
Road, Morris Township, New Jersey.
5.

Defendant The McNeil/Mehew Group, Inc. ("McNeil/Mehew")

is a Utah corporation with principal places of business in Utah and
New York.

Defendants Richardson, MC'Gregor, Peter Caruso ("Caruso")

and Remlinger are officers, directors, principals and/or
controlling shareholders of McNeil/Mehew.
6.

Defendant Buttonwood Management Associates

("Buttonwood") is a New York general partnership, of which
defendant Remlinger is also an agent, employee and/or officer.
7.

Defendants Caruso, Guy J. Cutuli ("Cutuli"), Gus Di

Biasi ("Di Biasi"), Robert A. Di Mizio ("Di Mizio"), and Anthony
Zero ("Zero"), are not residents of the State of Utah but each is a

,\[\
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general partner of Buttonwood Management Associates, a New York
general partnership.
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over the non-resident

defendants Buttonwood, Remlinger, Caruso, Cutuli, Di Biasi, Di
Mizio and zero, pursuant to the provisions of the Utah long-arm
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24.
9.

Sometime in October or November 1981, Richardson and

McGregor approached Cowan concerning possible sources of funding
for a proposed business venture.
10.

In late November, 1981 Cowan contacted Benz, a

business acquaintance, concerning the plans of Richardson and
McGregor.

Benz indicated that he might be interested in investing

himself and might also be able to obtain other investors.
11.

Cowan relayed this information to Richardson and

McGregor, who expressed their interest in meeting with Benz.
12.

On or about November 24, 1981, Remlinger and other

representatives of Buttonwood met with Benz and Cowan to discuss
various aspects of a proposal whereby Buttonwood would invest in
the business venture in question.
13.

On or about December 3, 1981, Richardson and

McGregor met with Benz and Cowan at Benz's offices in Morristown,
New Jersey.

At that meeting Benz advised Richardson and McGregor

that he had interested two potential investment groups in
participating in the proposed business venture.

'.\!:_\
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14.

The first of these groups involved West Bridge

Street Corporation, of which Benz is president and principal
shareholder.

Under the terms of this arrangement West Bridge

Street Corporation would enter into a joint venture with
McNeil/Mehew, a corporation to be formed in which Richardson and
McGregor would be the anticipated principals.

The terms of this

arrangement were embodied in the letter of intent c•Letter of
Intent") duly executed that day, a true copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference herein.
15.

The second group contacted by Benz principally

involved Remlinger and/or Buttonwood.

Benz and Cowan expressly

conditioned the arranging of any meeting with Remlinger upon the
agreement of Richardson and McGregor, in advance, that in the
event Richardson and McGregor and/or McNeil/Mehew entered into an
agreement with Remlinger and/or Buttonwood, Benz and Cowan would
receive as compensation for their efforts the sum of Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00)
(15%)

interest in any company formed.

in cash and a fifteen percent
Richardson and McGregor

expressly agreed to pay this compensation.
16.

On that same day Benz, Cowan, Richardson and

McGregor entered into a written Compensation
the terms set forth above.

Agreem~nt

embodying

A true copy of this agreement is

attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated by reference herein.

I

,\\[)

f.,,

-4-

17.

On December 3, 1981, the meeting with Remlinger was

held as scheduled.

Remlinger, at all relevant times, had notice

of the terms of the written Compensation Agreement attached hereto
as Exhibit B.
18.

Immediately following the meeting, Richardson and

McGregor represented to Benz and Cowan that they were not
interested in entering into an arrangement with Remlinger and
would instead pursue the terms of the Letter of Intent attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
19.

Notwithstanding such representation, Richardson and

McGregor subsequently, without notice to Benz and Cowan, entered
into an arrangement with Remlinger and/or Buttonwood pursuant to
which McNeil/Mehew was incorporated and capitalized.

Richardson,

McGregor, Remlinger and the partners of Buttonwood became
officers and directors in McNeil/Mehew.

Buttonwood, caruso,

Cutuli, Di Biasi and Di Mizio contributed $300,000.00 to
McNeil/Mehew to fund its operations in exchange for stock
ownership in McNeil/Mehew.

Subsequently, Cutuli invested or

loaned McNeil/Mehew an additional $65,000.00.
20.

Richardson, McGregor, McNeil/Mehew and the other

defendants have failed and refused to comply with the written
Compensation Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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The monetary

value of the fifteen percent (15%) share in the business venture
is incapable of calculation.
21.

Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have no adequate remedy at

law.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants:
1.

For specific performance of the agreement attached

hereto as Exhibit B, including payment of $250,000.00, plus
interest and fifteen percent (15%) of the common stock of
McNeil/Mehew.
2.

For compensatory damages of $150,000.00 and punitive

damages of $250,000.00.
3.

For costs of suit.

4.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper.
SECOND COUNT
1.

The allegations of the First Count of the Complaint

are repeated as if set forth at length herein.
2.

As a result of the aforementioned conduct, defendants

have been, and will continue to be, unjustly enriched at the
expense of the plaintiffs Benz and Cowan.
3.

Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have no adeqeuate remedy at

law.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants:
1.

For compensatory damages of $400,000.00.

2.

For the imposition of a constructive trust on any and

all profits earned by the defendants pursuant to the arrangement
among them.
3.

For an accounting.

4.

For costs of suit.

5.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper.
THIRD COUNT
1.

The allegations of the First and Second Counts of the

Complaint are repeated as if set forth at length herein.
2.

As a result of plaintiffs' aforementioned efforts and

expertise in bringing the defendants together, the financing was
secured to enable the subsequent incorporation of McNeil/Mehew and
its successful business operation.
3.

Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan provided defendants

valuable services for which they have received no compensation.
4.

Plaintiffs are entitled to the value of the services

they rendered to defendants.

s.

Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have no adequate remedy at

law.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants:
1.

For compensatory damages in the amount of $400,000.00.

2.

For costs of suit.

3.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper.
FOURTH COUNT
1.

The allegations of the First, Second and Third Counts

of the Complaint are repeated as if set forth at length herein.
2.

The actions of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the

defendant partners of Buttonwood intentionally, maliciously and
without justification induced or otherwise caused Richardson and
McGregor not to enter into or continue the prospective joint
venture relation with plaintiffs Benz and Cowan, as evidenced by
the Letter of Intent, attached as Exhibit A.
3.

Because of the unlawful actions of Remlinger,

Buttonwood and the defendant partners as alleged above, plaintiffs
Benz and Cowan have lost substantial profits and have been denied
a substantial ownership interest in McNeil/Mebew which would have
resulted from the final execution and performance of the terms set
forth in the aforementioned Letter of Intent attached as Exhibit A.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual
partners of Buttonwood:

.[\
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1.

For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive

damages of $250,000.00.
2.

For costs of suit.

3.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper.
FIFTH COUNT
1.

The allegations of the First, Second, Third and

Fourth Counts of the Complaint are repeated as if set forth at
length herein.
2.

The actions of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the

defendant partners of Buttonwood intentionally, maliciously and
without justification induced or otherwise caused Richardson and
McGregor to breach the written Compensation Agreement with
plaintiffs Benz and Cowan attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3.

Because of the unlawful actions of Remlinger,

Buttonwood and the defendant partners alleged above, plaintiffs
Benz and Cowan have lost substantial profits and have been denied
a substantial ownership interest in McNeil/Mehew which would have
resulted from the performance of the aforementioned Compensation
Agreement.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual
partners of Buttonwood:
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1.

For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive

damages of $250,000.00.
2.

For costs of suit.

3.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper:
SIXTH COUNT
1.

The allegations of the First, Second, Third, Fourth

and Fifth Counts of the Complaint are repeated as if set forth at
length herein.
2.

The actions of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the

defendant partners of Buttonwood intentionally, maliciously and
without justification interfered with the business and contractual
relations between plaintiffs Benz and Cowan and defendants
Richardson and McGregor.
3.

Because of the unlawful actions and tortious

interference of Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual partners
of Buttonwood, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan have lost substantial
profits and economic benefits from their business venture and
contractual relations with defendants, McGregor and Richardson.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants Remlinger, Buttonwood and the individual
partners of Buttonwood:

, ,\Tl
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1.

For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive

damages of $250,000.00.
2.

For costs of suit.

3.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper.
SEVENTH COUNT
1.

The allegations of the First, Second, Third, Fourth,

Fifth.and Sixth Counts of the Complaint are repeated as if set
forth at length herein.
2.

Plaintiffs Benz and Cowan had a reasonable expecta-

tion of prospective economic advantage from their participation in
either the arrangement attached hereto as Exhibit A or the
arrangement attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3.

The actions of the defendants herein jointly and

severally, maliciously and without justification, interfered with
plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of prospective economic
advantage which has caused the plaintiffs the loss of substantial
profits and economic benefits.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Benz and Cowan demand judgment
against the defendants:
1.

For compensatory damages of $400,000.00 and punitive

damages of $250,000.00.
2.

For costs of suit.
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3.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

proper.
DATED this

?:iri. day

of March, 1983.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Merrn

o.

Baer

JOA: Adams
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Peter A. Benz and David Cowan
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Peter A. Benz

DATEDz
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!nteat.

Street Corporet!oa

Decezr.ber J, 1981
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COMPENSATION AGR!:E:UO,"T

It is agreed between the parties hereto that
should Donald Remlinger and/or Buttonwood Management
Co. and its associates, affiliates, etc. enter into an
agreement with the ?1cNeil, Mehew Group, Inc. or Scott
McGregor and Eldon L.

Richar~son,

II either eirectly

or indirectly that David Cowan and Peter Benz shall receive
compensation as

follo~s:

(payee's also to include Bob

Fusar, Doug HUl!le and Richard Anderson) as their interest
mey appear:
l.

$250,000 cash

2.

A fifteen percent (l5tl interest in

any Company formed and arising from the aforeme~tioned

agreement.

This agreement entered into this 3rd day of
Decem:>er, 1981.
s/ David Cowan

s/ D. Scott ?1cGregor

s/ Peter A. Benz

s/ Eldon L. Richardson, !I
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